2.2.2.2. Familialism in housing

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Allen et al. (2004) apply their concept of familial SE welfare systems to housing by focusing on funding, land and building regulations, and their enforcement. SE is dominated by a high level of home ownership, yet housing is primarily not promoted by private developers, but often by families. In the provision of housing, the whole kinship network is mobilised who contribute with their own labour, finances, help in the arrangement of the building permit or legalisation of illegal constructions through clientelistic networks permeating public administration (ibid., pp. 147-148).

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Until recently, regulations encouraged self-building of housing to a large extent. Taxes on house purchase are very high in e.g. Greece and Spain (ibid., pp. 137-138), while strategic property transfers (e.g. dowry) within the family are taxed at very favourable rates (ibid., p. 149). In Athens, such strategic transfers constituted 70% of all transfers (Maloutas 1990 in Allen et al., 2004, p. 149) and in Italy, 23% of homeowners were given or inherited their houses (Tosi 1995 in ibid.). The commodification of housing through the expansion of mortgages is significantly impeded by high interest rates and mortgage regulations requiring large down payment (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009b).

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Self-provision (mostly self-build) of housing is however not encouraged solely by regulations favouring non-market provision, but also by the lack of regulations, and more particularly their weak enforcement. Construction on illegally occupied land and in low quality is, with the exception of Spain where strong planning regulations are in force for historical reasons, not prevented effectively by authorities in SE. Partly due to the high level of clientelism characterising public administration, regulations are not enforced by authorities effectively and as regulations are complex and they are subject to the high level of discretion of local authorities, they can be applied selectively, favouring families embedded in clientelistic networks (Allen et al., 2004, p. 177).

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The permissive attitude of authorities regarding illegal construction and the low quality of newly constructed dwellings can also be understood as a substitute for the rudimentary social housing policy in the region. Illegal construction was relatively widespread in the years of rapid urbanisation and expansion of the service economy when masses of people migrated to cities without access to housing. While social and housing problems caused by modernisation and rapid urbanisation were addressed by the strong involvement of the state in providing basic social services and housing in NWE, in the South such social tensions were managed by families using their own resources.

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Instead of purchasing housing produced by private developers through mortgages, or renting NRH, Mediterranean families are encouraged to obtain housing with the financial and physical help of their families and the state’s policy of enabling. In Italy, law for long protected self-constructed cottages from demolition and illegal constructions were legalised in successive post-facto arrangements (ibid., p. 176), but in all SE countries, with the partial exception of Spain, the share of illegal housing in the total housing stock is high (p. 179). Although housing construction has become more strictly regulated in the region in the past decades and consequentially self-build and illegal construction have decreased, other family-based forms of housing access such as intergenerational co-residence, family-assisted self-promotion and intergenerational financial transfers continue to be widespread (Allen et al., 2004, pp. 148–149).

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The result is a housing system characterised by a high share of self-provided owner-occupied housing; a very low share of large construction firms and a high share of small and black-market ones among housing providers whose gains originate in small-scale land speculation rather than increases in productivity (p. 178); a rather undeveloped housing finance system (ibid.); extensive urban sprawl with low density; relatively high average floor space but low housing quality (Dewilde, 2017).
 
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