Kováts Bence: The Financialisation of Housing and Housing-related Family Support in Hungary
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2. Theoretical foundations
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2.1. The role of family in the economy and society
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2.1.2. The global development of family relations
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2.1.2.2. Global re-familialisation and its causes

2.1.2.2. Global re-familialisation and its causes

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The development of global capitalism not only generated demographic changes, but also significantly affected the form and extent of de-commodification in nation states. Following waves of de-commodification, falling profit rates triggered a new cycle of re-commodification, extorting the retrenchment of welfare states.

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A significant shift towards re-commodification came around the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 in the form of austerity measures and the retrenchment of the welfare state introduced in different welfare regimes following the principles of neoliberalism (Jessop, 1996; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010). This period has also been marked by what Marxist interpretations describe as the switching of capital from the primary circuit of capital accumulation, characterised by efforts to increase the productivity of productive forces, into the secondary circuit of accumulation, fixing capital accumulated in the first circuit in the built environment, causing, among others, significant housing price appreciation (Harvey, 2006; Aalbers, 2016; Ryan-Collins, 2019).

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As explicated above, the role of the family in welfare provision is eroded by commodification while it can either be strengthened or weakened by de-commodification depending on its form. Several authors have argued that the last wave of global re-commodification will be addressed by a global trend of de-familialising de-commodification characterising the universalist social democratic welfare regime, relieving the family from its welfare-providing functions (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Streeck, 2009). This form of de-commodification is argued to have a more significant de-familialising effect than commodification (Esping-Andersen, 1999).

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Following this logic, the novel wave of commodification should in itself have contributed to the further weakening of the family (Flynn and Schwartz, 2017). Indeed, the decrease in time spent on reproductive labour (domestic and care work) in many regions of the world in the past decades indicates such a trend (Charmes, 2019). This is the reason why high-scale re-familialisation was not expected and, instead, researchers anticipated a countermovement that will successfully advocate for de-familialising de-commodification (Saraceno, 1997; Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Streeck, 2009; Flynn and Schwartz, 2017).

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So far, there is evidence that suggests the current wave of commodification does not trigger de-commodification, but re-familialisation occurs instead in spheres other than reproductive labour mentioned above. As described by Beck (1992, 2000), Esping-Andersen (1999) and Giddens (1991), the post-Bretton Woods era of post-Fordism is characterised by more insecure and unstable socio-economic conditions than the postwar period. This trend particularly affects young adults through rising youth unemployment (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007; Furlong, 2008; Clapham et al., 2010) and precarisation (McKnight, 2002; Antonucci, Hamilton and Roberts, 2014). In addition to the adverse economic effects, welfare states were also retrenched with more adverse effects on young people than the older generation (Preston, 1984; Sinn and Uebelmesser, 2003).

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Rising disparities between generations entail that due to the difficulties of meeting the economic conditions of becoming independent, a rising share of young adults cannot take advantage of the earlier independence enabled by the second demographic transition. This trend manifests itself most clearly in the rise of intergenerational support from older generations to the younger ones. Furthermore, as early adulthood is the life stage when individuals form independent households and housing has been at the heart of capital switching, it is not surprising that large part of increasing family support is housing-related (McKee, 2012; Lennartz, Arundel and Ronald, 2016; Flynn and Schwartz, 2017). Intergenerational co-residence and financial transfers are most often referred to as types of support on the increase in core countries. Besides co-residence, a form of housing provision, much of intergenerational financial transfers are provided to cover housing costs such as rent or purchasing an owner-occupied dwelling (Lennartz, Arundel and Ronald, 2016; Flynn and Schwartz, 2017; Ronald and Lennartz, 2018).
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