If we have already had occasion to refer to the reaction of the Muslim community to the doctrines of the khārijite movement and the question of legitimacy regulating social practice, we may certainly interpret on that basis the hanbalite tendency, which arose two centuries later but could look forward to a long future. In this the founder, Ahmad b. Hanbal (780–855) worked for the extremely logical formulation and acceptance of bases of faith that served societal and communal integration. This was fully understandable because, as we have mentioned previously, for a hundred and fifty years from the middle of the eighth century the most consequential struggle in Arab history took place, defining the foundation of events that followed; the point at issue was who should exercise hegemony in society. In due course the theocratic community was victorious through its intelligentsia of experts on religion, defeating the ancient Oriental model of imperial rule. That was when, as a decisive moment in the process, the "arabisches Reich” of the Umayyads yielded place to the Muslim patrimonial empire of the cAbbásids, drawing together all Muslims in terms of religion and politics and rising above ethnic considerations. In years to come the real problem was the degree to which the various elements were successfully integrated.2 It was probably the first century and a half of the cAbbāsid period that achieved most in this sphere: that was when Islamic orthodoxy was created, supported by Islamic studies, centred on the Koran and prophetic tradition; also at that time the system of formal and informal institutions3 began to take shape, creating the fragile balance between a theocratic community and the dynastic exercise of power. In this process the struggle4 between rationalism and traditionalism continued for a long time – the former based on Arabic translations of Greek works on philosophy and science, the latter rooted in revelation. The contestants were the representatives of the two academic blocs – religious studies and the "ancient sciences" – and the two intellectual bodies, experts on religion and philosophers. The victory of traditionalism was significantly assisted by Ahmad b. Hanbal's concept of Islam, which understandably favoured Islamic orthodoxy. If we look closely at the demands put forward by him, in fact we can see that they basically support usūl ad-dīn, the pillars of religion, and so the establishment and systematic requirements of the confession of faith and deal only indirectly with usūl al-fiqh, the basis of religious law. So, what does he regard as important? Based on the research of H. Laoust,5 we can regard the following elements as essential from the point of view of later developments. It is noticeable that he did not compile a compendium of usūl al-fiqh, and so he regarded that as secondary to the confession of faith. He took the Koran and sunna as the yardstick of faith, but in their literal meanings, resisting any kind of allegorical, rationalising etc. interpretations. The fatwa of the Prophet's "Companions" can be applied to these two incontestable fundamental sources (but their legal opinions are only supplementary support); characteristically, he did not regard ijmāc, the consensus of the community in question, as essential. He firmly rejected racy, the "opinion" of the expert on religion and religious law, but considered qiyās, analogy, usable within certain limits. It is to be emphasised that his confession required an ethically strict life-style, for which faith alone and the observance of formal rites did not suffice; the godly life demanded the union of word, deed, and intention. He objected strongly to the idea of rationalising theologians, muctazilita kalām (in his view, the Koran was the uncreated word of Allah) and the attributes of Allah had to be accepted on the basis of the Koran. Remarkably, although the purpose of declaring somebody to be an unbeliever was the unification of the community, he did not hold extreme views at all on the question of takfir, and considered expulsion from the community permissible only in cases of a number of offences: neglect of salāt – divine worship – and consumption of intoxicating drinks, constituted heretical behaviour. With regard to religious prescriptions and customs – cibādāt and cādāt – his attitude was that it was compulsory to carry out such of the former as Allah prescribed and of the latter to ignore such as He forbade; that, of course, left a certain flexibility, although qiyās meant a degree of regulation. He also had an original position on the exercise of political power and on the community: the ruler had to rely on the Koran and sunna, but he had a certain freedom of movement in the public interest (the leading figure in neohanbalism, Ibn Taymiyya, gives details of this in his work as-Siyāsa ash-sharciyya): the fundamental aim for the Muslim community was the assurance of order based on those two elements, but if the ruler failed to carry out this task it was the responsibility not of the community but of the experts on religion to restore him to the right way.