In what precedes I have tried, more or less logically, to distinguish between the fundamentalist movements of the classical model and the political (globalised, "jihādist") movements of the past two decades. We know that in this period numerous moderate movements too have appeared1 which have tried in Muslim countries, in Europe and America alike to form a certain modus vivendi with the relevant authorities, to take part in elections, and by other grass-roots activities to make their own ideas of Islam accepted. It has not, however, been these moderate currents that have left their mark on this period but the extreme Islamist manifestations; these latter have given shape to the menacing reality of inevitable conflict in America and Europe between Western and Islamic civilisations (Samuel Huntington's article, and later book, was an emblematic exposition of much of public opinion, and a number have similarly expressed the Islamophobia of the West), adding that in the meantime, popular support in the core Muslim countries for these extremes has been falling (we have mentioned that in the popular movements of the second half of 2011 – those that demanded more democracy – the role of the Islamists was not noticeable). In what now follows we shall make some observations on this militant, globalised, "jihadist" Islamism. In our opinion, with its incapacity for modernization, Islam has reached a parting in the historical ways. The two hundred years and more since the Napoleonic "adventure" has several times thrown up the question "how to proceed", but for a long time, it has appeared that radical responses could be brushed aside with various half-solutions (let us mention just the steps taken in Egypt: such were Muhammad cAlī's attempts at modernisation; the nahdha; the salafiyya movement of Muhammad cAbdu and his colleagues; the Wafd programme; Nasser's "Arab socialism", Sādāt's compromise with Israel and at the same time, his flirtation with Islam, the politicisation of Islam by the Azharite experts on religion in "intimacy shielded by power", etc). Of those, Muhammad cAlī and Nasser attempted radical "modernisation", but the first attempt was foiled by the European great powers (the French and mainly the British), while the second was a failure economically and a dead end politically. These attempts did, however, in their way try to confront the requirements of "modernisation" and sought to safeguard Islam in such a way that societal changes should not impact its foundations. This course, so it seemed, would become impassable in later times (the future of the "rentier states" that lived on oil was shaped rather differently, though what happened to Libya must to some extent foreshadow their development). The other alternative is the offer of globalising Islamism. While the attempts at solution of the first alternative did not lack elements of rational calculation and a degree of forward planning, the latter stands for a view that lacks Weberian goal-rationality, denies "otherness" and intends to destroy it; this, with its marked inclination for murderous attacks, is reminiscent of the extremist activity of the Bader-Meinhof group and the Red Brigades. A kind of "pure" fulfilment of this globalised Islamism was 11 September 2001, which is worth a little closer examination. This incident shows as if with chemical purity the absurdity of jihadist Islamism, and in so doing can testify convincingly to its unrealistic and irrational nature.2 Those that were first to give accounts of the event performed on the huge out-door stage were at a loss for words in defining it:3 was it a catastrophe, a tragedy, a crime, an act of war – one gormless TV reporter even tried using the word "accident". It was soon found that of the expressions in use in modern Western democratic societies not one was appropriate for the characterisation of the deed. Of those here mentioned 'act of war' seemed the most worthwhile, but on more careful consideration it became apparent that the attack on the twin towers did not meet the accepted criteria of warfare, including guerrilla warfare. We know that in Clausewitz's classic statement war is nothing more than the continuation by other means of politics that is suffering a temporary set-back with the object that after it has been won and lost the politicians shall talk again. It soon turned out, however, that the act planned and carried out by al-Qācida had no political purpose. That is, the West was faced with the paradox that the totally over-politicised Islamist current had no political ambition and was not trying to achieve its ideas through warfare as had become customary over the millennia.4 This is supported by the fact that Usāma bin Lādin and his colleagues did not formulate any kind of reasoned political demand after the action (neither at the time nor later could America even try to attribute their hostility to a concrete political goal). Lee Harris recommended for this behaviour – little affected by reality – the label fantasy ideology.5 Fantasy is called on to bridge the gap between our subjective picture of reality and the grim truth; normally this gives rise to no great trouble, but in a pathological case, the former tries aggressively to force itself on the latter. This can at times infect whole peoples, as in the cases of fascism and national socialism, as well as Stalin's idea of communism, that worked in a similar manner (though to less effect than the former).What this behaviour expresses – nourished on aggressive, false information – is a particular kind of belief, or rather superstition, which not only uses its fancies formed from reality as a crutch, a form of passive assistance (without this neither mankind nor the individual would able to survive for long, because the latter, with few exceptions, has no scientifically based knowledge), but regards them as the only means of salvation, forces them onto reality, and puts reality into the strait-jacket of its superstitions.6 These superstitions and myths started from belief that the world would end at the millennium, and were able to motivate the masses, and although after the Enlightenment their purely religious foundation was abandoned more and more they set themselves worldly objectives and functioned for the masses as a kind of religious substitute for superstition.