Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter IX. Evidence in the preparatory and investigative stages
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9.4. Investigation I: The detection phase
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9.4.7. Data collection methods: open and covert instruments

9.4.7. Data collection methods: open and covert instruments

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

Hungarian and international forensic practice has developed a number of methods for the collection of investigative data, which have historically been described in different forms and under different names in different pieces of legislation. Among these, the following should be highlighted:

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  • request;
  • softening;
  • preparing an environmental assessment;
  • observation;1
  • involving the public in data collection;
  • a forensic trap;
  • covert information gathering and data collection;
  • raster printing, etc.2
 

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  1. In the course of criminal proceedings, the authorities in charge of criminal proceedings mostly carry out open data gathering activities, the essence of which is that the persons in charge of the authorities do not make any effort to maintain the confidentiality of these activities, so that the fact of data collection can become known to the (target) persons concerned without prejudice to the interests of the investigation. This may be the case when the acting official
    • makes use of law enforcement databases for law enforcement purposes, as defined by law,
    • requests the disclosure of documents, data and the provision of information from: the head of a state or local government body, public body, economic organisation, foundation, public foundation or association, the body entitled to conduct an investigation, the person making the complaint or the victim,
    • visits the scene of the crime,
    • uses an expert adviser and checks the data obtained,
    • presents a photograph or other image on a data medium for identification purposes, asking for information about the person or object presented, etc.
  2. The use of covert means involves covert data-mining activities that are not and cannot become known to the (target) person concerned. The use of these methods obviously raises a number of questions of constitutionality and interpretation of the law, as they necessarily entail violations of certain fundamental rights, such as the inviolability of private and family life, the freedom of information flow, the right to confidentiality of correspondence and the protection of other personal data.
    AB Decision 2/2007 (I. 24.) stated that secret data collection tools and methods may be used in a democratic constitutional state in connection with certain serious crimes, where traditional means are not sufficient, and therefore the restriction of fundamental rights is not in itself unnecessary, but it may only be an exceptional, temporary solution, applied as a last resort. Accordingly, the use of these means must be purposeful, proportionate and regulated by law3 in order to avoid arbitrary use or abuse of the right.4
    The Court of Justice is obliged to take decisions on the fulfilment of the above conditions on the basis of the requests it receives. For example, it has found a breach of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) because
    • at the time of the telephone interceptions complained of, there was no legal rule on the use of listening devices in the law of the State of the applicant’s nationality;5
    • it has found a breach of Article 8 because despite the fact that French criminal procedural law did not contain any legal rules on interception in private homes (only the rules on interception of messages by telecommunications);6
    • the Swiss legislation on the use and registration of intelligence assets did not contain detailed rules on the acquisition of information, the recording of data or the processing of data.7
 

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

However, according to the Court’s case law, secret surveillance of communications by means of telecommunications equipment is permitted in democratic societies under certain conditions, but only on grounds of national security, public security or public order. Moreover, it is not incompatible with the Convention if the person concerned is not informed after the interception has ended, provided that this ensures that the interference is sufficiently effective.8

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

I would add that the Court of Justice includes in its assessment not only the total absence of legislation, but also its source of law. Accordingly, the use as evidence of the results of interceptions carried out by police chiefs on the basis of guidelines issued by the Minister of the Interior, which are not legally binding or directly accessible to the public, also infringes this fundamental right.9

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

Complex regulation is necessary in the case of these legal instruments because, in principle, they can affect the interests not only of the parties to the proceedings but also of persons outside the proceedings.10 In defining the relevant rules, the State must therefore also answer the question of the extent to which it may use law enforcement interests to restrict the rights of persons whose criminal liability does not arise in relation to a specific criminal case.11

9.4.7.1. Covert means (CPC)

9.4.7.2. Use of disclosed instruments in criminal proceedings

9.4.7.3. Use of disclosed information and termination of their use

1 In the Court’s view, the mere presence of a police officer within earshot when the applicant speaks to his lawyer for the first time after his arrest is a violation of the Convention. “Brennan case”, ECHR 2002/2, p. 16.
2 “According to the definition of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Rasterfahndung is the automated matching and comparison of different personal data files with the aim of filtering out and reducing the number of persons who meet the pre-defined criteria.” In: Fanni Pilisi: A bűnügyi adatgyűjtés, különös tekintettel a raszternyomozásra. [Criminal intelligence, with a special focus on raster investigations.] Büntetőjogi Szemle, 2021/2. 41.
3 The laws regulating the use of secret services must be particularly detailed. In this respect, the concept of “privacy” should not be interpreted too narrowly. BH 1996/5. 397. In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 291.
4 Endre Nyitrai: A titkos információgyűjtés és a titkos adatszerzés alkalmazása során felmerülő kérdések. [Issues arising in the use of covert information gathering and covert data collection.] Büntetőjogi Szemle, 2014/3. 32.
5 Case “Khan v. United Kingdom”, 12 May 2000, ECHR 2001/2 No 19. In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 292.
6 “Vetter vs. France” case, 31 May 2005. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 292.
7 “Amann vs. Switzerland” case, ECHR 2001/1. In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 292.
8 ECHR 1997/4, p. 20 In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 291.
9 “Elahi v. United Kingdom” case, 20 June 2006. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 294.
10 These include searches, seizures, etc.
11 Károly Bárd: A törvény és az ő alkalmazói. [The Law and its Applicators.] Fundamentum, 1997/2. 92–93.
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