The mediation process has recently been the subject of a considerable amount of criticism in the literature. “Anyone who sees mediation as a remedy for the ills of justice is likely to be disappointed,"1 writes Anna Kiss. In her view, the procedure is no less complicated than the criminal proceedings themselves. Finally, she concludes that the repressive nature of criminal law cannot disappear, since it was developed in this form by society’s self-defence mechanism.

 

The question rightly arises, of course, whether a more active role of the victim than is generally the case may not lead to an automatic “narrowing” of the rights of the debtor, or to a disproportionate extension of the debtor’s obligations. In my view, it is the task of the prosecutor, first and foremost, and of the mediator, second, to establish a fair balance. These persons must always take the personal circumstances of the accused as the primary consideration when suspending or conducting proceedings.10 Moreover, it takes several decades for the mediation process to become routine and for its possible errors and shortcomings to become known. It may have a future in Hungary because, on the one hand, there is international experience with the procedure and, on the other hand, there are precedents in Hungarian legislation (see the institution of social arbitration). Of course, its success in Hungary will depend primarily on the skills of practising lawyers. In addition, it is now a matter for the legislator to determine the legal conditions under which the procedure may be used. What is certain is that, even in the case of new types of crime, these boundaries will have to be drawn in the near future, where the interests of the victim and the resocialisation aspects of the offender do not yet prejudice the state’s interest in effective law enforcement.