Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter II. Paradigm shifts in the development of evidence in Hungarian law
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2.6. The effects of the regime change and Act XIX of 1998

2.6. The effects of the regime change and Act XIX of 1998

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

After the change of regime, the Constitutional Court identified the general aim of judicial proceedings as the discovery of procedural truth. This was despite the fact that the procedural rules in force at the time imposed on the court, without compromise, the requirement to establish the material facts as a matter of course. In its Decision No. 9/1992 (I. 30.) AB, the “court panel” pointed out that “the Constitution does not and cannot guarantee the attainment of material truth as a subjective right, since there are no corrective techniques that would sufficiently solve the limitations of the cognizability of the trial, which is its necessary element. The Constitution grants the right to the procedure necessary and, in most cases, appropriate to the attainment of substantive justice. The requirements of substantive justice and legal certainty are reconciled by the institution of res judicata, again on the basis of the primacy of legal certainty.”

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

The above approach was only minimally reflected in Act XIX of 1998, which – instead of categorically stipulating the obligation to establish the facts of the case – merely added to the basic principles of evidence that it is the duty of the courts to seek to establish the facts of the case. The 2006 amendment to the Act1 added to this rule the provision that “unless the prosecutor makes a motion, the court is not obliged to obtain and examine evidence in support of the charge.” However, this wording created a legal uncertainty, as it still did not prevent the court from not obtaining evidence in support of the prosecution’s case of its own motion. Practice showed that judges, in keeping with their “classical” role, usually continued to regard the primacy of the ex officio evidence as the rule. The main reason for these attitudes was the “fear” of the decision being overturned, which was also a well-founded assumption (the law left the grounds for unfoundedness unchanged, which meant that the practice of the courts of appeal had hardly changed).

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

It should be noted that the main objectives of the Government Decision (1994), which preceded the Act, were:

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  • the principle of separation of functions in criminal proceedings should be better applied;
  • a procedure must be established which, as regards the basic procedures, respects the principles of impartiality, adversarial proceedings and the parties’ freedom of choice;
  • the institution of co-arbitration should be maintained, but the powers of the single judge should be extended;
  • the possibility of judicial involvement in the pre-trial phase should be created in order to protect fundamental rights;
  • the possibility of a two-level ordinary appeal must be provided;
  • broadening the victim’s possibilities to pursue his or her claims (including the introduction of a substitute private prosecution);
  • simplified procedures should be established; and
  • regulatory problems in the area of “organisational law” (e.g. seating arrangements, appointment of defence counsel, etc.) must be resolved.2
 

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

The law was designed to increase the importance of the trial rather than the investigation.3 Nevertheless, it provided for the possibility for investigative authorities to investigate independently and, with regard to certain powers, it also empowered these bodies to take independent decisions without the involvement of the prosecutor.4 According to Hack, however, this legislation has not been able to regulate complex “mega-cases” with many defendants, which, in the author’s view, has led to the delay of trials that could be considered “national” in the eyes of the public, and which have accumulated criminal costs of several million forints.5
1 See LI Act 2006, § 37
2 Government Decree No. 2002/1994 (I. 17.). In: Hack ibid. 63–64.
3 László Pusztai: A büntetőper előkészítése. [Preparing the criminal trial.] In Árpád Erdei (ed.): Tények és kilátások. Tanulmányok Király Tibor tiszteletére. [Facts and Prospects. Studies in honour of Tibor Király]. Budapest, KJK, 1995. 33– 46.
4 Edina Czencz-Simon: A büntetőeljárás reformja – a nyomozás időszerűsége. [The reform of the criminal procedure – the timeliness of the investigation.] In Erika Csemáné Váradi (2009) ibid 69.
5 Péter Hack: A büntetőeljárás reformja. [Reform of criminal procedure.] In: Erika Csemáné Váradi (2009) ibid 69.
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