3.3. A fact to be proved – evidentiary fact – means of proof – act of proof – evidence – relevance – evidential force

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A fact to be proved is the fact that the offence was committed and the identity of the perpetrator, which is the subject of the criminal proceedings.1 The examination of the facts to be proved inevitably raises doctrinal questions relating to substantive criminal law, such as (1) the extent to which the act under investigation corresponds to the general concept of crime (e.g. social dangerousness, factual nature), and (2) whether there is any obstacle to criminal liability.

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It should be noted that the so-called historical facts, which are the direct subject of the case, are never in their entirety identical with the real act, but only include the facts necessary to decide the merits of the case.2 The difficulty is therefore that at the beginning of the cognitive process only the “more or less” known act(s) appear. However, proving the facts to be proved (e.g. historical facts) is possible because the causal processes which are set in motion by the act continue or originate from a time before the act began (antecedents).3 Examining all these factors can further “narrow down” the scope and make the selection of the facts to be proved more precise.

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The facts to be proved are basically set out in the indictment, which the courts are responsible for checking afterwards. In this context, the facts to be proved include, depending on the nature of the offence, the person of the offender, the motive and purpose of the offence, the preparation, the elements of the situation, the conduct, the method of commission, the means of commission, the result in the case of a substantive offence, or, for example, the causal link.4

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The CPC obviously does not even generally define the facts that must be proved in criminal proceedings, as each case has different specific features. However, Gödöny believes that this would be necessary, as it would provide a (general) reference point for determining the subject matter of the evidence during the investigation, which would greatly contribute to the proper preparation of the court’s work. The author adds that this exemplifying regulation could improve the quality of evidence (e.g. avoiding “additional investigations” and the need to examine additional witnesses in court proceedings).5

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An evidentiary fact is an argument that exists in the present and is capable of inducing a conviction,6 which the authority (court) in charge of the proceedings uses for the purpose of proof or excludes from proof – for formal or substantive reasons. In this context, Bócz makes a distinction between facts which are capable of being proved and facts which are probative: the latter category includes only those facts which are obtained “in accordance with” the procedural requirements, i.e. which comply in all respects with the requirements of legality.7 Types of evidence include:

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  • A fact in the form of a physical property or physical abnormality: in this context, direct observation by the authority or other persons is relevant. The primary source of cognition is the evidentiary instrument (e.g. physical evidence) or the evidentiary act (e.g. inspection). The individual “takes cognizance” of the cognized fact and establishes it. Because the evidence is subject to safeguards, these findings are also made in writing, the most typical form being a note or record. The authorities acting in the case in question thus “translate perceptions and observations into a more stable system of signals – i.e. they produce a derivative proof, a document. At a later stage of the proceedings, the material change is usually presented to the accuser and the court not in its original form but in the form of […] derivative evidence. It thus shows more than it originally showed.”8
  • Facts in the form of changes in the consciousness of persons: these include subjective memories and objective knowledge (“personal evidence”).9 Among these, one should single out testimonies that describe an experience or an experience in general conceptual-logical terms. The clarity of the meaning of the words in the statement is essential for an accurate understanding of these statements, which the interrogator must ensure by making the statements intelligible while preserving their substance.10 Precise, targeted questioning is a common “tool” for this purpose.

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The means of proof is the person or thing by means of which the evidentiary fact can be known. According to Móra, the means of proof are “persons or things which enable the authority to perceive the fact to be proved and thereby to infer the fact to be proved.” 11

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Of course, the concepts of evidence and means of proof are not the same: the latter is an abstract concept, information derived from the evidence (e.g. the contents of a witness statement).

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In jurisprudence, there is a controversy as to whether the means of proof should be included in procedural codes in a taxative or exemplificatory manner. For my part, I consider an exhaustive list to be the right legislative solution, since this technique provides clear and predictable rules for the law enforcement bodies and, overall, achieves a higher level of ‘legal certainty’. This does not run counter to the principle of ‘free provision of evidence’ either, since all other means of evidence that could potentially be relevant in criminal proceedings can be classified under the well and precisely defined legal instruments (e.g. witness testimony, expert opinion, physical evidence). This view is shared, albeit with different arguments, by Katona, who considers that “the illustrative list takes an excessively cautious position. This situation is obviously due to the well-known fact that our procedural jurisprudence has so far failed to properly delimit the concepts of evidence, means of proof and sources of evidence.”12

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The means of evidence are either (1) personal or (2) material. Fundamental doctrinal questions arise in relation to personal means of evidence, as it is not clear in legal literature whether the witness, the accused and the expert, or only the testimony or expert opinion of these persons, should be considered as such means of evidence. In my view, the latter solution is the correct one, since they are natural persons and cannot therefore be treated as instruments in the proceedings. For this reason, the CPC should also regulate the provisions relating to the status of witnesses and experts as individual subjects of the proceedings.

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According to the current and taxative Hungarian legislation, personal means of evidence are: (1) the testimony of the witness, (2) the statement of the accused, (3) the expert opinion and (4) the opinion of the probation officer. The concepts of document, documentary evidence and electronic data can also be included in the scope of material means of evidence.

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The act of proof is the procedure, regulated by law, in the course of which a fact becomes known. The act of taking evidence is a narrower category than the general concept of the evidentiary procedure. The procedure of taking evidence covers the entire process as a cognitive activity, whereas the acts of taking evidence are partial activities carried out in accordance with the rules of the applicable criminal procedure law and can only be carried out by the authority (court) authorised to do so.13 In other words, the act of taking evidence is an institutional activity of an authority (court) governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the conduct of which may lead to the discovery of evidence as a factual record.

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I would like to note that Act XIX of 1998 – dogmatically incorrectly – called the acts of taking evidence “evidentiary procedures”. Tremmel explains the necessary omission of the notion of evidentiary procedure on the grounds of the drafting of the law, as he considers it inappropriate to speak of ‘small procedures’, i.e. evidentiary procedures, in criminal proceedings, i.e. in the large procedure, whether it is an investigative act (e.g. inspection) or an act of evidence before the court (e.g. confrontation). 14

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Like the means of proof, the legal classification of evidentiary acts is a “delicate” issue – both from the point of view of the application of the law and from the point of view of procedural doctrine. I should note that the previous Act was criticised in this area as well, for example, Budaházi argued that the classification of the “evidentiary procedures” of Act XIX of 1998 was incomplete, as it did not include procedures such as polygraph examinations, the identification of odours by means of a service dog or other data-gathering activities of the investigating authority.15

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In contrast to the means of proof, the current CPC only lists the types of acts of proof in an exemplary manner, but this regulatory solution seems to be less of a concern, as the necessity of certain unregulated acts may only arise in practice in exceptional cases.16

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Evidence is the information (data) that has become known on the basis of the facts and means of proof or the facts and acts of proof. Evidence is objects or phenomena in the external world which have undergone some change as a result of past events and therefore have some of the characteristics of the external world, which make them directly accessible to the court. On the basis of these characteristics, evidence can be used to establish an adequate link between past events and the present judicial proceedings. 17

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Since “evidence” is a very abstract procedural concept which can be interpreted broadly, there have been many attempts to define it in recent legal literature. Before comparing them, however, I would like to note that the current CPC remains inadequate in defining this concept, which can be considered as one of the serious doctrinal shortcomings of the law. According to Pusztai, “only a clear and unambiguous concept of evidence is capable of becoming the basis of the rules prescribing the lawful manner and order of the use of evidence in criminal proceedings, and, with the logically structured system of further concepts closely related to it, it forms the backbone of the evidentiary procedure.”18

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There are several views on the definition of evidence in Hungarian legal literature:

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  • Lőrinczy defines facts as those which serve to establish the facts to be proved.19
  • In Gödöny’s view, evidence is a fact – obtained from the sources permitted by law and in accordance with the procedural requirements – which is capable of establishing (additional) facts that are relevant to the case.20
 

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Evidence can be classified according to the following criteria:

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  • Illegal – legal evidence: in the author’s view, the best solution in the former case is to exclude illegal evidence from the proceedings ex lege, i.e. at the level of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus not to leave this activity to the discretion of the judiciary; also, the criminalisation of acts committed in connection with illegal evidence is a strong deterrent.21
  • Irreversible – reversible evidence: in the former case, evidence that comes from sources that can only be examined once, on a case-by-case basis; such evidence therefore carries a higher risk of detection, as (investigative) errors cannot usually be corrected afterwards, and the subject of the evidence is not even perceived by most of the subjects of the proceedings, but is only indirectly known from various documents (e.g. seizure report or photographic evidence).
  • Original – derivative evidence: in the former case the evidence comes from an original (primary) source, in the latter case from an intermediary (secondary) source. For example, the content of a witness’s testimony may be considered original evidence, while the fact that the witness heard from another person and reported this in his or her testimony may be considered derivative evidence. In the same way, a fact from an original document is original evidence, while a fact from a copy is derivative evidence. There are, of course, many examples in practice where only derivative evidence can be used to (1) locate, (2) verify,22 or (3) replace23 the original evidence. However, original evidence can often become derivative evidence in the course of the proceedings: for example, traces are original evidence, but because they are used in the form of a photograph, they are transformed into derivative evidence. In summary, derivative evidence can, as a general rule, only be taken into account in the proceedings to the extent that it can lead to the acquisition of original evidence.24
  • Incriminating – exculpatory evidence: this dichotomy is rather relative, since in many cases it is not possible to place a given piece of evidence in only one of the conceptual categories; for example, the content of a confession of a revealing nature as evidence leads to the establishment of criminal liability, while on the other hand it is taken into account as a significant mitigating circumstance in the imposition of a sentence. The discovery of exculpatory evidence is, of course, a legal obligation not only for the defence, but also for the investigating authority and the prosecuting authority (in this evaluation process, of course, the subjective judgments of the law enforcement officer will often be involved).25 It may also be the case that (1) an “incriminating witness” is questioned on facts that could be considered as exculpatory evidence, or (2) the prosecuting authority questions the witness proposed by the defence on inculpatory evidence.26 However, there is also evidence that is both incriminating and exculpatory. Thus, for example, the use of a firearm for self-defence may establish a legitimate defence, but it may already be capable of establishing the offence of misuse of a firearm27 if the offender does not have a licence to use a firearm.
  • Direct – circumstantial evidence: in the case of the former category, if it is considered credible by the authority (court), the relevant criminal fact can be established “in one step”; in the latter case, however, only the intermediate (so-called “circumstantial”) evidence is established. “in the latter case, it is only possible to establish an intermediate (related) fact, after which further proof is required;28 indirect evidence can therefore be considered more as a probability basis which (merely) generates further suspicions or factual hypotheses;29 indirect evidence is therefore a case where the relevance of the evidence is not clear to the court, which draws some conclusion on the basis of a multi-step logical process.30 Thus, for example, “identification by means of the bullet taken from the victim’s body also directly proves that the crime was committed with that weapon. In contrast, an identification based on a shell casing found at the scene of a crime only proves that the shell casing came from the weapon, but requires separate proof of the connection of the shell casing with the incriminated shot.” 31
  • According to Lőrinczy, the guilt of the accused can only be established on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the evidence forms a closed logical chain, otherwise the law enforcement officer commits a violation of the law when weighing such evidence. 32
  • According to Fayer, “circumstantial evidence was accepted as a sufficient basis for conviction, but the ordinary penalty could not be imposed in such a case. In many codes we find an express provision that in the case of half or more, but not complete, evidence, the extraordinary (lighter) penalty should be imposed. The death penalty, which was imposed for most crimes, was not allowed to be imposed on the basis of circumstantial evidence.”33
 

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To summarise: indirect evidence allows multiple conclusions to be drawn, while direct evidence can only lead to one solution. It should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: the Court) has held that the use of indirect evidence is not in itself contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: the Convention), especially if the national law itself allows its use.34
 

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Based on Gödöny’s categorisation,35 four theories on the interpretation of evidence have been developed in legal literature:

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  1. Evidence = source of evidence; these theories are mainly specific to procedural law.
  2. Evidence = source of evidence or probative fact (both terms can be used); this is the position taken by Vámbéry, among others, who says that “the factual circumstance from which the court draws the conclusion: the cause of proof, the person or object which provides the cause of proof: the means of proof, the combination of both – [is] evidence.”36 In foreign literature, this position is taken by, among others, Strogovich, Sifman, Trusov, Grodzynski, Horosowsky, and Schindler.
  3. Evidence = source of evidence + evidentiary fact (as a cumulative fact); according to the proponents of this view, the concept of evidence cannot be used in two senses, because the sources of evidence, or the facts derived from them, have evidentiary value only together.

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  • The above position is taken, among others, by Tremmel, who argues that “there is no such thing as data without a data source, in criminal proceedings only the data source, namely the legal data source and the data, namely the data on the fact relevant to the criminal proceedings, constitute evidence.”37 Kertész also asserts that “these two sides […] form a close unity which can only be viewed separately in artificial isolation from each other.”38 In foreign literature, similar reasoning can be found mainly in the publications of Ulyanova and Prituzova.39 Critics of this view, however, argue that this is “a speculative interpretation which does not correspond either to the legal provisions or to the nature of the practical activity carried out by investigative bodies and the judiciary.”40

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  1. Evidence = probative fact; according to the theory that is most widespread in the literature – and also in line with Gödöny’s view – only this definition meets the theoretical and practical requirements for evidence. “The connection and interaction between the fact constituting the evidence and its source is indisputable. Nor can it be denied that both are of considerable importance in the proof. However, their importance is not the same. The role of the fact (evidence) in the proof is different from that of its source.”41 This is also the view of Pusztai, who argues that the adoption of this definition is justified by the fact that the procedural acts of the investigating authorities, which in many cases are of a formally sound nature, often do not involve any fact-finding and are therefore inadequate to provide evidence (probative fact).42

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  • In legal literature, the validity of the distinction between physical and written evidence, and the principle of the distinction, is disputed. Some authors also consider written means of evidence (documents) to be material evidence, despite the fact that they have special characteristics in terms of their form and content.
  • The distinction between personal and material evidence also raises interesting questions:
    • According to Simor, “the logical thinking human brain must be interposed between the objects attached to place and time and the human act continuously taking place in space and time; inference must necessarily be resorted to in order to establish the spatial and temporal occurrence on the basis of material evidence; in the case of personal evidence, this requirement does not necessarily exist.” 43
    • According to Koristka, forensic forms of data storage are mental or material: “we talk about mental storage when the signals from an event are taken by a person, the information elements are stored in human memory and reduced at a later time.”44 In contrast, material storage is a material record.
    • According to Kertész, material evidence is characterised by the mechanical reflection of the relevant fact, while other evidence is characterised by the mental-psychic, conscious reflection.45 “The intelligibility of the information in the form of verbal evidence, its ready-to-prove character, is in contrast to the natural code of the information content of material evidence, which is to be verbalized.”46 In agreement with this line of thought, I myself believe that while the interpretation of physical evidence necessarily involves active (intellectual) activity on the part of the person acting as an authority, such activity is not necessarily required in the case of clear personal evidence.
 

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  1. Relevance: the relevant means of proof or evidence is the evidence that the competent authority (court) considers to be usable, appropriate and relevant to the resolution of the case. Accordingly, relevance does not depend on the actual veracity of the evidence; in other words, false evidence may also be relevant. If, on the other hand, the truth of the evidence is irrelevant to the evidence, it may not be relevant in the first place.47 It is, of course, always up to the authority (court) hearing the case to determine or rule out relevance.
  2. The probative value is the property of a proving fact that leads to the belief that the fact to be proved is true.48 This term therefore has an additional meaning compared to the concept of relevance, since it results in the specific means of proof or evidence being taken into account when deciding on criminal liability. About the evidential value:
    • According to some opinions, an evidentiary instrument is the property of an evidence which is capable of influencing the conviction of the authorities (especially the court) in criminal proceedings.
    • According to Lajos Nagy, the criterion of the means of evidence is the extent to which the given means of evidence is able to influence the members of the competent authorities in their convictions, whether factual or legal. In assessing the relevance of evidence, the first step is to make an assessment of the evidence and then, in a “second step”, to weigh it against the other evidence. 49
    • According to Katona, “the probative value of the facts used in evidence is determined primarily by their truth or falsity as an objective element, but the finding that results from the assessment of the credibility of the source of evidence is also a factor in the formation of the conviction.”50
    • Kertész points out – indirectly – that the value of some evidence cannot be established in an exact way, in isolation from other evidence.51
    • According to Erdei’s conclusions, the concept of probative value has two essential components: (1) it is related to the internal conviction of the person evaluating the evidence as to the correctness of the facts that can be established from it, the essential basis of which is the lack of credibility; (2) its assessment generally depends on the result of the comparison of the evidence with each other.52
 

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Based on the above, it is certain that there is still no unanimity in legal literature regarding the definition of the basic concepts discussed in this chapter, and the current CPC does not provide the conceptual guidelines I consider necessary. Although the clarification of the basic dogmatic concepts is primarily the task of the respective jurisprudence, it would be worthwhile to consider the application of law drafting methods through which the meaning of as many basic concepts as possible could become clear and unambiguous for the law enforcement bodies, even in the interpretative (introductory) provisions. As I explained earlier, this would not affect the principle of free proof, but would greatly facilitate the coherence of legal interpretation.
1 BelovicsTóth (2020) ibid. 162.
2 BóczLakatos (2008) ibid. 33.
3 BóczLakatos (2008) ibid. 33–34.
5 According to Galkin, this is an essential condition for the legality of the procedure. In Gödöny (1968) ibid. 76–77.
6 BelovicsTóth (2020) ibid. 162.
7 BóczLakatos (2008) ibid. 34.
8 BóczLakatos (2008) ibid. 39.
9 BóczLakatos (2008) ibid. 34.
11 MóraKocsis (1961) ibid. 267.
12 Géza Katona: A nyomok azonosítási vizsgálata a büntetőeljárásban. [The identification of clues in criminal proceedings.] Budapest, 1965. 12.
13 Evidentiary activities can be carried out by the defence and the accused, but they are not entitled to order and carry out evidentiary acts.
15 Árpád Budaházi: Bizonyítási kísérlet a büntetőeljárás szolgálatában. [Evidence in the service of criminal procedure.] http://pecshor.hu/periodika/XV/budahazi.pdf
17 Az ítéleti bizonyosság elméleti és gyakorlati kérdései. [Theoretical and practical issues of certainty of judgement.] ibid. 16.
18 László Pusztai: A szemle fogalma. [The concept of inspection]. In Mihály Tóth (2003) ibid. 249.
19 György Lőrinczy (1998) ibid. 214.
20 Gödöny (1986) ibid. 136.
21 See also the current Criminal Code, which contains such offences: e.g. perjury, forced confession, breach of privacy
22 Thus, for example, “a witness gives evidence of facts which he has heard from another witness […] On the basis of this evidence, the investigator summons and interrogates the witness with direct knowledge, who, however, presents the facts differently. The investigator may attempt to clarify the contradiction during the questioning or may order the witnesses to be confronted. On this basis, he may be able to determine which of the witnesses’ testimonies is the truth […] The other case is when a witness with direct perception is questioned first, but the investigator becomes aware that he has communicated his perceptions to others before or after the questioning, in a different way from what he has stated in his testimony. In this case, this person(s) must also be interviewed.” In Gödöny (1986) ibid. 162–163.
23 For example, according to Strogovich, this is the case when, because of the death of a witness, the investigating authority can only question as witnesses those persons to whom the person has reported the circumstances he or she has observed. In Gödöny (1986) ibid. 164.
25 For example, in the case of involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution can terminate the investigation in the absence of a crime if it considers that the suspect was not even negligent in the outcome. The reverse is also possible, but these decisions are often based on the prosecutor’s general sense of justice.
26 Gödöny (1986) ibid. 170.
27 CC 325. §
28 This is one reason why this kind of evidence is called “circumstantial evidence” in English literature.
29 Nevertheless, in most systems of evidence, there is no obstacle to courts basing the criminal liability of defendants solely on circumstantial evidence.
30 Under English rules of criminal procedure, indirect evidence such as hearsay evidence cannot be used as evidence. In contrast, in Dutch criminal procedure, the trial is much more limited to checking the contents of the file at the investigation stage. In Eszter Mária Köpf. Hungarian Law, 200/4. 243.
31 Erdei: On some issues of the stability of identification criteria in forensic firearms theory. Criminological Studies VIII. Budapest, 1970. 343. In Kertész (1972) ibid. 402.
33 László Fayer:The Hungarian Criminal Procedure in Today’s Validity. Bp. Franklin-társulat, 1887. 2–3.
34 András Grád – Mónika Weller: A strasbourgi emberi jogi bíráskodás kézikönyve. [Handbook of Human Rights Jurisprudence in Strasbourg.] Budapest, HVG-ORAC, 2011. 369.
35 Gödöny (1986) ibid. 125–130.
36 Cf. Vámbéry In: László Pusztai (2003) ibid. 246.
37 Flórián Tremmel: A bizonyítás és a bizonyíték fogalma a büntetőeljárásban.[The concepts of proof and evidence in criminal proceedings.] Pécs, 1970. In Pusztai (2003) ibid. 246.
38 Imre Kertész: The theory of physical evidence in criminal procedural law and criminology. Budapest, KJK, 1972. 67.
39 Pusztai (2003) ibid. 246.
40 Dorohov, V. In: Teorija dokazatel’sztv v sovetszkom ugolovnom proceszsze. Moscow, 1966. 262. In: Pusztai ibid. 248.
42 László Pusztai: Nyomozási cselekmények a bűntett helyszínén. [Investigative acts at the crime scene.] Belügyi Szemle, 1968/11. 60–65.
43 Pál Simor: A tárgyi bizonyíték. [The material evidence.] Budapest, Kriminológiai Tanulmányok V., 1966. 6.
47 Árpád Erdei: Tény és jog a szakvéleményben. [Fact and law in the opinion.] Budapest, KJK, 1987. In: M. Tóth ibid. 227.
49 Lajos Nagy: Tanúbizonyítás a büntetőeljárásban. [Witness evidence in criminal proceedings.] Budapest, 1985. 233–248.
50 Erdei: Tény és jog a szakvéleményben. [Fact and Law in Expert Opinion.] ibid. 226.
51 Erdei: Tény és jog a szakvéleményben. [Fact and Law in Expert Opinion.] ibid. 227.
52 Erdei: Tény és jog a szakvéleményben. [Fact and Law in Expert Opinion.] ibid. 227.
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