4.11.2. The obligation to respect fundamental rights

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This principle is intended to protect the rights of not only the accused, but also of all the subjects of the proceedings, and even of persons who are involved in the proceedings but are not subjects. The importance of the new Act – in comparison to Act XIX of 1998 – is indicated by the fact that the new Act declares in its introductory part the following: in criminal proceedings, the human dignity of everyone must be respected;1 everyone must be guaranteed the right to liberty and security of person; a fundamental right may be restricted only in the proceedings under this Act, for the reason, in the manner and to the extent specified in this Act, provided that the objective to be achieved cannot be ensured by other procedural acts or measures involving a lesser restriction [§ 2 (1)–(3)].

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There are numerous possible cases for violating this principle,2 but in practice, perverse situations may arise in relation to the interpretation of the principle of publicity and the imposition or maintenance of coercive measures.

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  1. The principle of publicity is a basic procedural rule, but in many cases this may affect the personal rights of the accused, in particular his or her human dignity.3 Nevertheless, there is a tendency for criminal courts to impose fewer restrictions on publicity than civil courts, mainly because of the seriousness of criminal cases and the level of information provided to the public (media). Therefore, it is less common for the court to grant the defendant’s (defence) requests to exclude the public, merely on the grounds of the defendant’s human dignity, personal rights or even on grounds of clemency.
  2. In principle, coercive measures may restrict most of the fundamental rights set out in international conventions and the Fundamental Law. The question is, of course, whether it is possible to speak of a violation of rights in cases where the grounds for imposing the coercive measure in question exist and its imposition complies with the procedural rules. In my view, no, since, as I have already pointed out, the interests of proof in many cases necessarily override the fundamental rights of the person subject to the procedure. Without these limitations, criminal proceedings would not be able to fulfil their inherent function. The only problem I see is that the terminology used in the current Criminal Code does not precisely cover the scope of the fundamental rights that can be restricted by coercive measures, as it only refers to coercive measures affecting ‘personal liberty’ or ‘property’.4 Thus, for example, it would have been more appropriate to mention separately the category of coercive measures affecting ‘freedom of movement’ in the case of restraint and ‘personal integrity’ in the case of search. The law could thus have declared the complexity of the legal restrictions imposed by coercive measures and the diversity of the adverse legal consequences they entail.
 

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The Court of Justice has explained the proportionality requirements for coercive measures taken in the interest of evidence in almost all fundamental rights:

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  1. In the context of coercive measures restricting personal liberty, pre-trial detention is an exceptional measure, never mandatory and never applicable for punitive purposes; it may be imposed only if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person concerned has committed the offence in question and there are real grounds for believing that one or more of the following apply:
    • the risk of absconding;
    • the risk of interference with the course of justice;
    • the risk of committing a serious crime.
 

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In the case of pre-trial detention, the courts must assess the nature and seriousness of the suspected offence, the probative value of the evidence that the person concerned committed it, the penalty that could be imposed if he or she is found guilty, the personality, criminal record, personal and social circumstances and conduct of the person concerned (in particular as regards the enforcement of any obligations imposed by previous criminal proceedings).5

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  1. In an era of coercive measures that limit personal integrity, the use of searches and physical coercion in particular can raise the possibility of abuse of rights by the authorities. In one case, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) when the doctor started to induce vomiting in the hospital after the victim had swallowed a bag of cocaine, since this was not done to protect the victim’s physical and mental integrity, but solely to obtain evidence. This method of execution was in itself capable of creating a feeling of fear and vulnerability in the person being examined, and it also carried risks, since it was not preceded by a thorough medical examination.6
  2. Among coercive measures restricting the right to respect for private and family life
    • a violation of rights occurs when masked police officers break into a person’s home at dawn without the consent of the person being prosecuted; 7
    • if the investigating authority searches the victim’s home without the warrant being produced or without any information being provided about the property to be searched.8
 

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Finally, the Court held that this right extends not only to private dwellings, but also to the protection of the registered office, place of business and place of management of companies.9
1 For example, you must not endanger the victim’s physical integrity or otherwise humiliate him or her during an attempt to give evidence
2 For example, in “Z. v. Finland”, the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention because of the publication of the judgment of the court of appeal, which included the identity and legal status of the applicant. This fundamentally affected the right to human dignity of the accused. ECHR 1998/3. In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 249.
3 In many cases, the full names or photographs of suspects are published in certain reports without a final judgement on criminal liability.
4 See § 272.
5 ECHR 1997/2, p. 60 In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 261.
6 “Jalloh vs. Germany” case, 11 July 2006. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka ibid. 283.
7 The suspect was charged with the crime of extortion by a district police chief, at the end of which the accused was acquitted by the court. Case “Kucera v. Slovakia”, 17 July 2007. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 256.
8 In such cases, it is therefore not sufficient to refer to general rules of law. Case “Imakaieva v. Russia”, 9 November 2006. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 282.
9 BH 2003/10. 796. In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 282.
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