Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter IV. Principles of evidence
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4.11. Legality of evidence (the principle of legality)
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4.11.4. The principle of immediacy

4.11.4. The principle of immediacy

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The principle of immediacy is a basic requirement for court hearings and expresses the fact that the examination of evidence must be based on the direct and joint perception of the procedural subjects. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, which often give rise to some concern among legal practitioners and jurists.

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Enforcing the principle of impartiality in court proceedings makes the court’s work much easier when developing a credible, well-founded case. The purpose of enforcing the principle is therefore to ensure that the original sources of evidence are discovered and used in the proceedings, as far as possible without mediation.1

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The Hungarian legislation has already created the possibility for the courts to conduct hearings without the presence of the accused and to make a decision on the case in several constructions. A good example of this is the creation of a separate chapter B on absent defendants, or the option to hold the ordinary second instance proceedings even in the absence of the duly summoned defendant (and to hear the appeal) if no appeal has been filed against the defendant,2 etc. It should be noted that some jurisdictions also recognise the category of so-called condamner par contumace, which are passed against defendants who are absent through no fault of their own, without the presence of legal representation at the trial. However, the Court has held that this method of sanctioning is contrary to the provisions of the Convention.3

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According to the consistent practice of the Court of Justice, evidence must be presented in open court in the presence of the accused, in accordance with the requirement of an adversarial procedure.4 The Court’s practice is consistent in ensuring the right of the accused to be present, since, although it allows the use of these constructions, it limits their scope to strictly defined cases. On the basis of its case law:

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  1. a trial in absentia is not in principle contrary to the Convention, but only if the person concerned subsequently re-examines the factual and legal basis of the charges against him or her before a court which will hear him or her in person;5
  2. the right to personal appearance may be restricted only if the accused has waived his or her right to personal appearance and to a personal defence;6
  3. there is no interest in guaranteeing the personal presence of the accused before the courts of appeal, which only adjudicate on points of law7 ; however, in the case of appeal proceedings, it is sufficient for the procedural law in question to provide for the mere presence of the accused and the defence.8
 

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The Court found a breach of the Convention when

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  • the Court of Appeal took evidence of alleged procedural errors during the appeal proceedings, but neither the accused nor the defence lawyer were informed of this and could not be present;9
  • the summons was served 2 days before the day of the trial; 10
  • the accused was not informed at all of the date of the appeal hearing before the Supreme Court.11
 

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However, the Court did not find a violation of the Convention where the accused had voluntarily stayed away from the trial, or where the accused complained about the restriction of his right to comment in the appeal proceedings, despite not appearing at the trial.12

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The Strasbourg rulings are mainly related to witness evidence. It is a fundamental principle that the accused must be given the opportunity to challenge incriminating testimony, an essential element of which is the provision of conditions for personal questioning of witnesses. However, according to the Court’s case law, it is not necessarily required for such persons to be questioned (directly) at trial, and in certain cases it is permissible to allow only the subsequent presentation of investigative statements.13 However, the testimony of co-accused persons with the right to remain silent can only be decisive evidence if the other accused persons have been granted the conditions of an adversarial procedure.14

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The Court found a breach of the Convention when

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  • the applicant was convicted by a court in his own country on the basis of a complaint in another country and the testimony of witnesses who were heard in his absence;15
  • the prosecuting authorities did not make every effort to ensure that the accused could attend the trial in person, despite the fact that other procedures would have made it possible to establish his real whereabouts;16
  • the court of appeal convicted the applicant, who was acquitted at first instance, of defamation on the basis of a new assessment of the facts, without a personal hearing.17
 

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However, the Convention is not violated in interrogations using a closed telecommunications network if there are compelling reasons to do so. The Court has held that a case where a witness was examined by the court using such a device was compatible with Article 6. This was justified by legitimate aims, since the subject of the accusation was linked to participation in a criminal organisation, premeditated murder and misuse of firearms.18

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The possibility of submitting a written witness statement may also cause problems. Such testimony is usually either (1) handwritten or (2) typed (signed by two witnesses or countersigned by a lawyer) and is therefore considered to be of full probative value. However, in Kertész’s opinion, “in the case of written statements, there is no personal contact between the investigator and the person being questioned, no possibility to clarify vague and difficult to understand parts of the statement during the interview […]; the written statement of the interrogated person cannot replace the interrogation, it can only supplement it […]; the written statement must precede the interrogation, the interrogated person must be given the opportunity to write down the statement in his own hand only after the statement has been made and recorded.” 19
1 Csilla Hati: A közvetlenség elvének térvesztése a büntetőeljárásban. Igazság, ideál és valóság. [The loss of the principle of immediacy in criminal proceedings. Truth, ideal and reality.] In Balázs Elek – Tamás Háger – Andrea Noémi Tóth (eds.): Tanulmányok Kardos Sándor 65. születésnapja tiszteletére. [Studies in honour of the 65th birthday of Sándor Kardos.] Debrecen, 2014. 155.
2 § 600 (3) para.
3 Krombach v. France judgment of 13 February 2001, no. 29731/96. In: Grád–Weller (2011) ibid. 365.
4 “Lüdi vs. Switzerland” case, 26 May 1992. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 250.
5 “Poitrimol v. France”, 23 November 1993, Series A, No 277-A. In Vincent Berger. Budapest, 1999, p. 297; “Colozza v. Italy”, 22 January 1985, p. 327.
6 “Sejdovic vs. Italy” case, 1 March 2006. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka ibid. 328.
7 Grád–Weller ibid. 364.
8 Kamasinski v. Austria judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A no. 168. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 364-365.
9 Komanicky v. Slovakia judgment of 4 June 2002, no. 32106/96. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 364.
10 Ziliberg v. Moldova judgment of 1 February 2005, no. 61821/00. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 364.
11 Maksimov v. Azerbaijan judgment of 8 October 2009, no. 38228/05. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 364.
12 K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium judgment of 17 February 2005, no. 42758/98. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 365.
13 E.g. for particularly protected witnesses
14 EJF 2002/1. 18. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka ibid. 307.
15 A. M. v. Italy judgment of 14 December 1999, no. 37019/97 In: Grád–Weller (2011) ibid. 362.
16 Colozza v. Italy judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 363.
17 Constantinescu v. Romania judgment of 27 June 2000, no. 28871/95. In: Grád–Weller ibid. 316.
18 “Marcello Viola vs. Italy” case, 5 October 2006. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 298.
19 Imre Kertész: A kihallgatási taktika lélektani alapjai. [The psychological foundations of interrogation tactics.] Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1965, 286.
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