5.2.4. Characteristics of the status of the debtor
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Hivatkozások
Válaszd ki a számodra megfelelő hivatkozásformátumot:
Harvard
Bérces Viktor (2024): Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. : Akadémiai Kiadó.
https://doi.org/10.1556/9789636640477 Letöltve: https://mersz.hu/dokumentum/m1199eicp__60/#m1199eicp_58_p1 (2024. 11. 21.)
Chicago
Bérces Viktor. 2024. Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. : Akadémiai Kiadó. https://doi.org/10.1556/9789636640477 (Letöltve: 2024. 11. 21. https://mersz.hu/dokumentum/m1199eicp__60/#m1199eicp_58_p1)
APA
Bérces V. (2024). Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. Akadémiai Kiadó. https://doi.org/10.1556/9789636640477. (Letöltve: 2024. 11. 21. https://mersz.hu/dokumentum/m1199eicp__60/#m1199eicp_58_p1)
In England, until 1899, there was no possibility at all for the accused to testify in their own cases. This was based on the logic that “it is wrong to make a person swear to tell the truth when he has every reason to swear.”1 The turnaround was based on the judicial approach of the 1970s, which explicitly required judges to directly call defendants to testify if there was direct evidence against them and they were considered physically or psychologically healthy.2
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Hivatkozások
Válaszd ki a számodra megfelelő hivatkozásformátumot:
Harvard
Bérces Viktor (2024): Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. : Akadémiai Kiadó.
https://doi.org/10.1556/9789636640477 Letöltve: https://mersz.hu/dokumentum/m1199eicp__60/#m1199eicp_58_p2 (2024. 11. 21.)
Chicago
Bérces Viktor. 2024. Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. : Akadémiai Kiadó. https://doi.org/10.1556/9789636640477 (Letöltve: 2024. 11. 21. https://mersz.hu/dokumentum/m1199eicp__60/#m1199eicp_58_p2)
APA
Bérces V. (2024). Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. Akadémiai Kiadó. https://doi.org/10.1556/9789636640477. (Letöltve: 2024. 11. 21. https://mersz.hu/dokumentum/m1199eicp__60/#m1199eicp_58_p2)
I would note that a fundamental dilemma in contemporary English legal literature concerning the testimony of the accused is what can be inferred from “incriminating silence”. In general: does it entail any legal disadvantage for the accused in the proceedings? According to Glainville, “the innocent does not stand silent, but defends himself with arguments, impatiently waiting to answer the questions of the doubters. If he does not do so, it cannot be forbidden to invite the jury to exercise their discretion to assess the silence.”3 In Averill v. United Kingdom (2000), the Court also held that Article 6(1) and (2) of the Convention (presumption of innocence) is not infringed when the accused’s silence is assessed by the court as incriminating evidence, if this circumstance is only one of the factors supporting the prosecution’s case. 4
1 Mihály Tóth (1995) ibid. 218.
2 Mihály Tóth (1995) ibid. 218.
3 Mihály Tóth (1995) ibid. 218.
4 6 June 2000, ECHR 2001/2.23. In: Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 257.In the case of “Magee v. United Kingdom” (2000), however, the Strasbourg forum found that Article 6.1. (right to a fair trial), as the applicant was deprived of the opportunity of legal representation for 48 hours, during which time psychological coercion was used which contributed to the applicant abandoning his defence, initially in silence. 6 June 2001, ECHR 2001/2.