Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter VII. The material and formal concept of truth • The concept and practical problems of the level of certainty
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7.2. The level of certainty in Anglo-Saxon legal systems

7.2. The level of certainty in Anglo-Saxon legal systems

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In the Anglo-Saxon legal systems, we encounter the concept of reasonable doubt, which requires only a kind of “moral certainty” on the part of the legal practitioner. This concept is obviously based on the assumption that the legal practitioner is not present at the time the facts are established and is therefore unable to reconstruct the events beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the aim of the proceedings cannot be other than to establish formal truth by ensuring maximum procedural fairness. These two factors can be regarded as the yardstick for the success of the proceedings. In Kadlót’s view, it is also the construction that best serves legal certainty, since

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  • the authorities’ law enforcement activities remain under control by giving victims the possibility to bring a supplementary private prosecution;
  • this creates the possibility of “accountability” for public bodies;
  • there is no risk of ex-post corrective procedures from a burden aspect, as procedural guarantees continue to apply.1
 

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The proceeding authorities consider the procedure to be a “contest of the parties”, in which the state’s role is limited to providing the conditions and framework for the contest by means of legislation. According to Petra Bárd, these procedural guarantees are “not primarily a safeguard against state arbitrariness, but a necessity arising from the Anglo-Saxon conception of justice.”2

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Other features of this model include:

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  1. The trial is the main stage of evidence, with particular attention being paid to the principles of publicity, hearsay, impartiality, presumption of innocence and the right of defence.
  2. The judge accepts as factual allegations not contested by the parties, including that the accused is guilty, and in such cases his or her role is reduced to “merely” imposing a sentence.
  3. The jury plays a passive (receptive) role: in principle, it only perceives as facts in the proceedings what the judge presiding over the trial considers necessary to decide the dispute, and therefore “sees” the case with this body.
  4. The parties shall determine:
    • the subject of the dispute;
    • the facts to be proved (the court will only decide on these, of course);
    • the necessary extent of the search for “truth”;
    • the date of the end of the litigation (the most common form is a plea bargain):3 if the parties reach an agreement, there is no further remedy, as the process has fulfilled its function.
  5. The primary consideration for evidence is its “procedural reliability”, not whether it is capable of establishing substantive truth.
 

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Notwithstanding the above, there is no substantial difference in the social acceptance of legalisation-based judgments in the US courts and in continental jurisdictions. Damaska argues that the Anglo-Saxon system calls into question the correspondence theory of truth, i.e. the existence of objective truth. Instead, “it seeks to arrive at the truth by the clash of arguments between the parties, by the contest between them. This is not to say that the common law is indifferent to truth, but merely that it has reservations about the idea of an unquestionable truth above all else, since the administration of justice as a practical social activity inevitably presupposes the existence of a reality beyond our claims.”4 In this system, therefore, criminal judges are merely seeking the most optimal legal solution available, the “truth of the parties”, which is the most feasible at the moment. 5
1 Kadlót (2009) ibid. 53.
2 P. Bárd (2014) ibid. 39.
3 I will analyse the scheme in detail in the context of the simplification procedures.
4 Damaska ibid. 36.
5 In Trechsel’s words, “procedural justice is also doable.” Delivered at Stefan Trechsel’s inaugural lecture in Zurich. 20 December 1999. In Károly Bárd, Human Rights and Criminal Justice in Europe. The fair trial in criminal cases – a treatise on human rights law. Budapest, Hungarian Official Gazette, 2007. 48.
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