The current CPC has changed this practice somewhat. The legislator recognised – in part – that by formulating the obligation to seek substantive justice, the law would create an inconsistent regulation, since the law still contains legal provisions that inherently hinder the achievement of this objective. These include the prohibition of self-incrimination, the right of the accused to remain silent, certain prohibitions on taking evidence, various obstacles to testimony, the obligation to protect classified information, special rules for the case of a cooperating accused, the settlement agreement or the mediation procedure. Despite all this, the tendency will of course remain for Kadlót to maintain that the idol of substantive justice will continue to be fiercely defended by the legal practitioners and that legal institutions based on the principle of opportunity – diversion – will continue to be seen as an “attack on their own competence.”2 On the other hand, according to Somogyi, “however much the establishment of material fact may be a statutory requirement of the procedure, and thus the aim of the proof in court, it cannot in fact be fulfilled with objective certainty, nor can it be decided with absolute certainty whether the court’s finding of fact is in fact the truth of the matter. This implies a convergence or ‘reconciliation’ of the concepts of substantive truth and procedural truth.”3