Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter VII. The material and formal concept of truth • The concept and practical problems of the level of certainty
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7.8. Conclusions

7.8. Conclusions

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

In the light of the above theoretical positions and the “anomalies” of proof, I think that we are right to use the concept of “justice in litigation”, but not in the context in which it appears in Anglo-Saxon legal systems. Indeed, ‘procedural justice’, as it is called, expresses, and therefore includes, a combination of both systems:

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  • the pursuit of substantive justice (this follows automatically from the existence, function and constitutional position of the courts)
  • judicial control of the evidence from the point of view of legality, and
  • the requirement that the prosecution’s case must, as a general rule, be brought by its representative.
 

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

There is no need, therefore, to distinguish between the concepts of substantive and formal justice-seeking; the elements of both systems can be represented by a uniform application of the concept of justice in litigation. I also consider it superfluous to distinguish between the concepts of absolute and relative justice, since procedural justice necessarily represents, in all cases, a half-way solution between the two.

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

Absolute truth is what happens at the scene of the act under proof and is experienced by the persons present. However, since the sequence of these acts and the time interval of the proof are necessarily different, the level of absolute truth cannot be attained.1 This position is confirmed by the following authors:

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  • According to Teréz Szabóné Nagy, objective truth “is not fully identical with any of the philosophical notions of absolute truth;"2
  • According to Farkas, “finding out the truth is a requirement for us, we have to strive for it, but we do not claim that it is always available. Human possibilities are limited here.”3
 

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

Along with this, the use of the concept of ‘relative truth’ is also wrong, since the application of the rules of criminal procedure, the judicial control of evidence necessarily shifts this relativity in a direction that leads to a higher concept of truth (truth in the trial), which is the result of judicial control.
1 Note that it is not necessary to have full knowledge of the underlying facts to reach a final decision.
2 Teréz Szabóné Nagy: A büntető eljárási rendszer alapjai. [Fundamentals of the Criminal Procedure System.] Budapest, 1966. 55.
3 József Farkas: Bizonyítás a polgári perben. [Evidence in civil proceedings.] Budapest, 1956. 49.
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