Doctrinal or dogmatic legal research as a method involves the systematic examination of existing legal sources, such as laws, regulations and court decisions, in order to understand how the law currently addresses sustainability issues. The classic types of this are the four distinct but systematized interpretation (Lat. interpretatio, hermeneutica) methods developed by Savigny in the mid-19th century: grammatical, logical, systematic and historical interpretation.1 The four canons of legal interpretation do not indicate independent paths, but represent stages of interpretation that build on each other.2 In the second half of the century, Jhering’s teleological interpretation was added to this, which explores the meaning of the norm based on its objective purpose and social purpose.3

 

 

The constitutional conformity interpretation can also be derived from Kelsen’s hierarchy of norms (legal sources) with the concept of the basic norm (Ger. Grundnorm).4

 

For a practical approach, these interpretations can be demonstrated through some basic examples. (1) A law states: “No industrial activities shall take place in a protected forest base.” The grammatical interpretation of ‘industrial activities’ literally means that an authority or court may prohibit any activity like logging, mining, or construction, even if it occurs with minimal environmental impact. (2) For the logical interpretation, a statute exempts environmentally friendly enterprises from certain regulatory fees. Because the law doesn’t define what qualifies as ‘environmentally friendly,’ we use logic, the interpreter examines the internal coherence and reasoning – e.g., companies reducing CO2 emissions significantly but producing some plastic might still qualify. The focus is on rational consistency when applying the exemption. (3) A rule on water protection must be largely read alongside national climate adaptation legislation. The systematic interpretation considers how water protection rules interact with laws on the environment, energy or land-use in order to establish an integrated legal system that does not give rise to inconsistencies. (4) The 1990 environmental statute prohibits the use of certain chemicals commonly used in agriculture. The historical interpretation looks at the necessity of how to address legislative discussion and environmental standards in the year in question and decide if similar chemicals developed after 1990 that were not expressly included should be included. (5) The teleological (purposive) interpretation may be illustrated through the example oftax benefits provided by law for ‘green technologies.’ In that case, instead of just relying on the language or distinct categories, the interpreter can ask: “What is the purpose?” And if it is emissions reduction, then newer clean technologies (e.g., hydrogen fuel cells) not expressly identified as ‘green’ also qualify. The goal is sustainability and environmental protection. (6) The law allows local authorities to approve polluting factories not requiring environmental impact assessments. A constitutional interpretation might invalidate or (re)interpret the provision based on the fundamental right to a healthy environment or intergenerational justice in order to uphold social (constitutionally codified) values.

 

Corpus linguistics8 has become an increasingly popular method of legal and constitutional interpretation over the past decade, particularly in the United States.9 Its legitimacy derives from the fact that courts have consistently held that statutory terms, when not legally defined, should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning. Judges, with the help of the linguistic community, have responded to this challenge by using corpora to determine which meanings are ordinary. However, legal analysts have not yet defined precisely what makes one meaning ordinary and another not. Furthermore, while linguists who conduct corpus linguistic analysis generally emphasise the importance of context, legal application is notably context-free, consistent with legal philosophies that reject reference to the purpose of the law and the intent of the legislator who enacted it.10 This step adds a political dimension to corpus analysis as a tool for legal interpretation.