Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter IV. Principles of evidence
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4.4. The principle of charge and official proceedings

4.4. The principle of charge and official proceedings

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

The most important aspect of the principle of charge is that it places the burden of proving guilt entirely on the accuser, so the accused is not required to prove his or her innocence.1 This principle is not, of course, intended to supersede the function of the defence, but the defence must be an active participant in the evidentiary process – all the more so since it is obliged to do so by the Code of Criminal Procedure itself. However, the defender and the accused are often in a more difficult position than the accuser, since they have to prove not the occurrence of an event (positive proof) but its untruthfulness (negative proof). In most cases, this is not even possible with concrete evidence, so the defence is most often limited to challenging the results of the positive evidence, e.g. by questioning the credibility of the testimony.

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

There are two exceptions to the principle of incrimination, in which cases – according to the rules of the Criminal Code – the burden of proof is reversed and falls on the accused: (1) if the accused fails to prove that the property acquired during the period specified in the Act did not result from a criminal offence, confiscation must be ordered in respect of that property,2 or (2) if the accused does not prove the truth of the facts alleged by him, he shall be criminally liable for the allegation in the case of defamation, making a false statement or false photograph capable of defamation, publishing a false statement or false photograph capable of defamation, libel and slander. 3

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

The importance of the enforcement of the principle of officialdom has been stressed in a number of Hungarian case law decisions, such as:

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  • in the case of the use of weapons with lethal results, the opening of a thorough investigation of its own motion, capable of identifying and sanctioning those responsible;4
  • the ex officio obligation to carry out a substantive investigation if a person in custody who is not recognised by the authorities disappears without a trace;5
  • in the investigation phase, it is always necessary to investigate ex officio whether the prison staff tortured the prisoners;6
  • the authorities are obliged to provide information ex officio on the whereabouts of persons in their custody; failure to do so will lead to an investigation by the prosecutor;7
  • ex officio, if a person in the custody of the authority becomes a victim of a criminal offence through the negligence of the authority.8
 

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

In relation to the principle of officiality, the Court found a violation of the Convention when the Bulgarian authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the death of the applicant’s partner, thereby depriving him of an effective remedy.9 Other Strasbourg rulings include:

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

  • in Kaya v. Turkey, the Court ruled that when persons acting on behalf of state bodies cause the death of any person in the course of the use of arms, an effective investigation is ex officio mandatory;
  • if a person in good health dies in custody, it is the responsibility of the state to investigate the circumstances at the appropriate level.10
1 Thus, for example, the burden of proving the existence of a ground excluding criminal liability or limiting criminal liability cannot be shifted to the accused (BH 1981.317.).
2 CC Section 74/A. However, I would like to note that these facts are not directly related to the proof of the prosecution either, since in such cases it is also the duty of the prosecutor to prove the criminal responsibility of the accused with regard to the offence for which confiscation of property is to be applied. In. Summary Opinion (2017) ibid. 68.
3 CC § 229.
4 BH 2002/ No 2, 158.
5 BH 2000/3 No 239.
6 BH 2001/11 No 877.
7 BH 1998/11 No 175.
8 BH 2002/1 No 72.
9 “Velikova v. Bulgaria”, ECHR 2001/2 No 20.
10 EFJ 2001/2 No 21. In Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka (2008) ibid. 218–219.
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