Viktor Bérces: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
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Chapter IV. Principles of evidence
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4.5. The principle of prohibition of self-incrimination

4.5. The principle of prohibition of self-incrimination

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

On the basis of this principle, no one is obliged to make a self-incriminating statement or to give evidence against himself or herself in criminal proceedings.1 If the prosecuting authority (court) commits a serious breach of the rules governing incriminating statements, for example by failing to warn the accused of his right to remain silent, the evidence that has become known is considered to be unlawful and cannot form the basis of the facts. If the court nevertheless uses it in reaching a decision on the merits, this may lead to the decision being unfounded and annulled.

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

In this context, Háger draws attention to an interesting practical problem: “If the evidence of a procedural violation is disregarded in the decision making process, the judgment is not unfounded, but the result may be different from the truth.” 2

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

Judicial practice interprets this principle strictly: according to a 2001 Hungarian decision, it is also a violation of the prohibition of self-incrimination to read out at trial, without the consent of the accused, previous statements made in connection with the case in other proceedings before the authorities.3 However, according to the consistent case law of the Court of Justice, the use of information obtained under duress by the authorities but which exists (objectively) independently of the will of the accused is not prohibited: this could include, for example, the results of a smear test, a blood sample or a urine test. 4

Jegyzet elhelyezéséhez, kérjük, lépj be.!

However, the Strasbourg forum found a violation of the Convention when the accused, who had confessed in the absence of his defence lawyer, withdrew his confession during the re-interrogation, now in the presence of his defence lawyer, but the court nevertheless convicted him and did not even examine whether his interrogation in the absence of his defence lawyer was lawful at all. The Court subsequently found that he had the right to remain silent and that he was immune from self-incrimination.5
1 CPC § 7 (3) para.
2 Andrea Noémi Tóth – Tamás Háger: A terhelt vallomása a büntetőeljárás bírósági szakaszában, egyes eljárási szabálysértések megítélése. [The testimony of the accused in the court phase of criminal proceedings, the assessment of certain procedural violations.] Miskolci Jogi Szemle, 2013/2. 79.
3 BH 1998/3. no. 233.; BH 2001/10.
4 Czine–Szabó–Villányi–Baka ibid. 307.
5 Yaremenko v. Ukraine judgment of 12 June 2008, no. 32092/02. In: Grád–Weller (2011) ibid. 372.
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