7.3. The level of certainty in continental legal systems

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The continental systems operate with the concept of an “beyond reasonable doubt” (intimate conviction standard), which imposes stronger requirements on official (judicial) procedures than moral certainty. This “contributes to the public justification and legitimisation of judicial decisions. Courts maintain the appearance of basing their decisions solely on real, not just probable, facts […].”1 This is one of the reasons why continental systems confer on judges a ‘monopoly of justice’, so that final judgments are presumed to be true.2 According to Tremmel, this is why judicial decisions in continental legal systems are “perceived as stronger than reality.”3 Because of the higher level of evidence, the role of evidence in the investigation is much greater, and the basic task of the trial is to establish all the real and relevant facts, in which the judge’s role is the most active, since procedural law entrusts him with the recording and taking of evidence.4

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In the continental model of judicial work, the specialised judge establishes the facts relevant to the adjudication of the dispute and then compares them with the relevant legislation, resulting in the legal conclusions. At a theoretical level, this adjudication process involves three distinct activities:

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  • establishing the facts,
  • the legal classification of the facts,
  • the determination of the legal consequences (enforcement of legal consequences is already a matter for the enforcement of sentences stage).
 

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The basic social expectation is that the judge should base his decision on facts that are in conformity with reality and that he should correctly determine the legal norm that gives rise to the legal consequence. This presupposes a level of internal conviction on the part of the judge on which a decision on the merits can be based.5
1 Mátyás Bencze: Az ártatlanság vélelmének érvényesülése a magyar büntetőbíróságok gyakorlatában. [The Presumption of Innocence in the Practice of Hungarian Criminal Courts.] Belügyi Szemle, 2011/9. 20.
2 Tibor Király: A büntetőhatalom korlátai. [The limits of criminal power.] Magyar Jog, 1988/9. 740.
3 Flórián Tremmel (2001) ibid. 457.
4 “The task of criminal law is: to establish the true facts, to ascertain the substantive truth and, on this basis, to apply the provisions of the criminal law if the accused is found guilty, and, otherwise, to acquit the accused or to terminate the proceedings. In order to achieve this end, it is necessary to determine whether the facts relevant to the prosecution, i.e. those on which the taking of a measure or the making of a decision or the decision of the whole case depends, are true. For it will only be possible to establish the substantive truth if the facts on which the court bases its decision are true. This is established by means of evidence, that is to say, by the action in court by which the truth or falsity of a fact relevant to the decision or action of the court or other authority called upon to act (prosecutor, gendarmerie) is established.” Balogh–Illés–Varga. Budapest, Grill, 1899. 479.
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