Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz

Constitutional Justice under Populism

The Transformation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Hungary since 2010


Some classic dilemmas of constitutional adjudication in a new light

The next chapter will show that the classical dilemmas of constitutional adjudication in the post-2010 Hungarian constitutional space, in the legal system established by the two-thirds constitution-making majority, are placed in a particular light. The almost continuous constitution-making majority of the party coalition elected in 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022 has created an unfavourable, suboptimal situation for democratic separation of powers, because a constitution that can be changed by the government majority at any time, by definition, can hardly be suitable for limiting public power. It could have been considered that the constituent power could have been self-restricted by establishing a stricter rule on constitution-making and constitutional amendment, but this was not done. The opposite has been the case, with constitution-making and constitutional amendment becoming a tool of daily politics, with one new constitution having been written quickly in 2011 and eleven amendments added to it in the past 12 years. The 2011, let us say, consolidated version of the former Constitution became a completely new one by amendments and by interpretation in the past 12 years responding to the needs of the daily party politics. The question is what role the Constitutional Court can play in this political system: can we still talk about constitutional review as a limit to the elected majority, what does constitutional activism mean in this constitutional environment, and can we question the review of constitutional amendments when they violate the fundamental principles and values of constitutionalism? Can that Constitutional Court, that operates in the current political environment with a permanent two-thirds constitution-making majority, have any chance of retaining its classic constitutional function?

Constitutional Justice under Populism

Tartalomjegyzék


Kiadó: Akadémiai Kiadó

Online megjelenés éve: 2024

ISBN: 978 963 454 971 0

In Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party won a landslide victory and the newly formed populist Orbán-government gained a two-thirds constitution-making parliamentary majority, which it has kept for four consecutive terms (so far). In the spring of 2011, the National Assembly adopted Hungary’s new Fundamental Law, which has since been amended twelve times. The transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and constitutional jurisprudence has played a significant role in cementing the new regime. The changes can be followed in a chronological order in this book. The author starts with the explanation of the concept of constitutional adjudication, she then reviews the procedural-institutional developments and the critical doctrinal junctures of the past thirteen years with regard to the general assessment of the change in constitutional justice. Finally, the volume offers a reading of how the scholarly experiences and factual results of the thirteen years spent under populism compare to the ideal of constitutional-court-made constitutional justice.

Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz is research professor at the Institute for Legal Studies, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and professor of constitutional law at ELTE Law School, Budapest. She worked as law clerk at the Hungarian Constitutional Court in different positions between 2003 and 2013. She has published extensively on different aspects of constitutional law, including the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the impact of different contemporary challenges to constitutional adjudication, as well as the rule of law resilience of Hungarian legal system.

Hivatkozás: https://mersz.hu/gardos-orosz-constitutional-justice-under-populism//

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