Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz

Constitutional Justice under Populism

The Transformation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Hungary since 2010


A “countermajoritarian difficulty”

A library of literature has been written on the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication worldwide,1 because the constitutional court is a modern constitutional institution, empowered to review legislation made by a legislator who has won a legislative mandate in a democratic election. The Constitutional Court on the other hand is not itself composed of members directly elected by the people. In the event of unconstitutionality, constitutional courts, however, annul legislation. Furthermore, the judges not only lack direct electorate support, but in most countries around the world, the Court is composed of members of an elite, run by people of high social status, operating according to a legal type decision-making procedure.2 Constitutional courts uphold the separation of powers, the democratic functioning of the state and are responsible for the protection of human rights against mostly directly elected public power.3 In sum, although they are not themselves organised through direct democratic procedures, they can review legislation adopted by the supreme representative body.4 The question is how the dilemma of the exercise of constitutional review power against the majority power is presented in Hungary.5

Constitutional Justice under Populism

Tartalomjegyzék


Kiadó: Akadémiai Kiadó

Online megjelenés éve: 2024

ISBN: 978 963 454 971 0

In Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party won a landslide victory and the newly formed populist Orbán-government gained a two-thirds constitution-making parliamentary majority, which it has kept for four consecutive terms (so far). In the spring of 2011, the National Assembly adopted Hungary’s new Fundamental Law, which has since been amended twelve times. The transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and constitutional jurisprudence has played a significant role in cementing the new regime. The changes can be followed in a chronological order in this book. The author starts with the explanation of the concept of constitutional adjudication, she then reviews the procedural-institutional developments and the critical doctrinal junctures of the past thirteen years with regard to the general assessment of the change in constitutional justice. Finally, the volume offers a reading of how the scholarly experiences and factual results of the thirteen years spent under populism compare to the ideal of constitutional-court-made constitutional justice.

Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz is research professor at the Institute for Legal Studies, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and professor of constitutional law at ELTE Law School, Budapest. She worked as law clerk at the Hungarian Constitutional Court in different positions between 2003 and 2013. She has published extensively on different aspects of constitutional law, including the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the impact of different contemporary challenges to constitutional adjudication, as well as the rule of law resilience of Hungarian legal system.

Hivatkozás: https://mersz.hu/gardos-orosz-constitutional-justice-under-populism//

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