In Hungary, the main lines of human rights protection were introduced in the democratic transition of 1989-1990.1 The Constitutional Court of Hungary, operating from 1 January 1990, had a major role in elaborating on the rules that were agreed by the parties and adopted in the constitutional text and in further legislation consented to by the first democratically elected Parliament. The Fundamental Law, adopted in 2011 by the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly of the Fidesz–KDNP (Orbán) Government, preserved the conceptual considerations of the former Constitution and, as to the rules on the scope, objectives and limitations of human rights protection, it adopted very similar if not identical wordings. Although in 2013 the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law declared all Constitutional Court decisions that were issued before 2012 ineffective, and in spite of the constantly changing practice of fundamental rights protection, especially with regard to certain rights, interestingly enough, the doctrine itself or at least the main lines of the doctrine did not change, but were rather colored by for example compulsory elements of constitutional interpretation or the change in fundamental rights enforcement measures.2 In this subchapter, I will describe the main elements of the standards of fundamental rights protection in normalcy and in emergency in Hungary in order to give basis for further discussion on the jurisprudence in crisis situation. My main argument is that the emergency standards of human rights protection are not only underdeveloped in the Hungarian legal system, even though the development has been in progress since 2015, but are also in contradiction with the main undertakings of the constitutional state in relation to the greatest possible, guaranteed protection of human rights.