Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz

Constitutional Justice under Populism

The Transformation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Hungary since 2010


Standards of human rights protection in the special legal order

In the former Constitution, Article 8 (4) listed the rights that may not be suspended or restricted even in a state of emergency or a state of danger. These rights include the right to life and human dignity, legal capacity and the rights to liberty, security of person, presumption of innocence and the right to defence, freedom of conscience and religion, the provisions of the Constitution relating to equality, non-discrimination, the rights of the child, minority rights, rights relating to citizenship, and the right to social security and benefits. The formal end of a state of emergency automatically ends all restrictions on fundamental rights.1 In Article 8 (4), the former Constitution defined the scope of the rights which cannot be restricted or suspended even in special situations. The new Fundamental Law, which entered into force in 2012, continued this tradition of rights restriction in the special legal orders. Article 52 of the Fundamental Law states that during the period of special legal order, the application of the Fundamental Law may not be suspended. During the period of special legal order, the exercise of fundamental rights, except for the fundamental rights provided for in Articles II (human dignity) and III (prohibition of torture), and Article XXVIII (2) to (6) (fundamental procedural rights), may be suspended, or may be restricted beyond the extent specified in Article I (3). The structure and the fundamental considerations in the human rights protection in emergencies has, therefore, been the same since the 1989 democratic transition at the constitutional level.

Constitutional Justice under Populism

Tartalomjegyzék


Kiadó: Akadémiai Kiadó

Online megjelenés éve: 2024

ISBN: 978 963 454 971 0

In Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party won a landslide victory and the newly formed populist Orbán-government gained a two-thirds constitution-making parliamentary majority, which it has kept for four consecutive terms (so far). In the spring of 2011, the National Assembly adopted Hungary’s new Fundamental Law, which has since been amended twelve times. The transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and constitutional jurisprudence has played a significant role in cementing the new regime. The changes can be followed in a chronological order in this book. The author starts with the explanation of the concept of constitutional adjudication, she then reviews the procedural-institutional developments and the critical doctrinal junctures of the past thirteen years with regard to the general assessment of the change in constitutional justice. Finally, the volume offers a reading of how the scholarly experiences and factual results of the thirteen years spent under populism compare to the ideal of constitutional-court-made constitutional justice.

Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz is research professor at the Institute for Legal Studies, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and professor of constitutional law at ELTE Law School, Budapest. She worked as law clerk at the Hungarian Constitutional Court in different positions between 2003 and 2013. She has published extensively on different aspects of constitutional law, including the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the impact of different contemporary challenges to constitutional adjudication, as well as the rule of law resilience of Hungarian legal system.

Hivatkozás: https://mersz.hu/gardos-orosz-constitutional-justice-under-populism//

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