Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz

Constitutional Justice under Populism

The Transformation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Hungary since 2010


Background

Hungary is an open economy, highly dependent on European and world trends. Hungary has been a member of the European Union since 2004, with GDP growth of around 60-70% of the European average, according to Eurostat. The issue of economic catching-up has always posed problems. Even in 2004, before the economic crisis, the European Commission launched a deficit procedure against Hungary for its long-term unbalanced budget. The onset of the economic crisis in this situation in autumn 2008 had serious consequences: by 2009, GDP had fallen by almost 7%. In response to this, the government adopted an unorthodox economic policy, which tackled the crisis with innovative solutions rather than traditional economic policy instruments.1 Some of these were at the level of constitutional arrangements, building a state in which state interference in economic competition, centralised economic governance and centralisation of resources played a major role. It was also essential to keep the state in control of sectors of high importance, including by influencing the ownership structure. The system of state aid also changed, and the Hungarian state, seeking to limit EU rules, sought to give preferential treatment to domestic companies, even by introducing special taxes on foreign-owned companies in the banking or telecommunications sectors. Trade turned from the West to the East in the hope of expanding economic links and economic growth, and the public works programme was launched, which the state hoped would lead to higher employment rates.

Constitutional Justice under Populism

Tartalomjegyzék


Kiadó: Akadémiai Kiadó

Online megjelenés éve: 2024

ISBN: 978 963 454 971 0

In Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party won a landslide victory and the newly formed populist Orbán-government gained a two-thirds constitution-making parliamentary majority, which it has kept for four consecutive terms (so far). In the spring of 2011, the National Assembly adopted Hungary’s new Fundamental Law, which has since been amended twelve times. The transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and constitutional jurisprudence has played a significant role in cementing the new regime. The changes can be followed in a chronological order in this book. The author starts with the explanation of the concept of constitutional adjudication, she then reviews the procedural-institutional developments and the critical doctrinal junctures of the past thirteen years with regard to the general assessment of the change in constitutional justice. Finally, the volume offers a reading of how the scholarly experiences and factual results of the thirteen years spent under populism compare to the ideal of constitutional-court-made constitutional justice.

Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz is research professor at the Institute for Legal Studies, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and professor of constitutional law at ELTE Law School, Budapest. She worked as law clerk at the Hungarian Constitutional Court in different positions between 2003 and 2013. She has published extensively on different aspects of constitutional law, including the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the impact of different contemporary challenges to constitutional adjudication, as well as the rule of law resilience of Hungarian legal system.

Hivatkozás: https://mersz.hu/gardos-orosz-constitutional-justice-under-populism//

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