After the economic crisis, the framework for constitutional review was fundamentally determined by the restriction that the Constitutional Court has essentially no power to conduct constitutional review on issues concerning the central budget. This has led to certain issues not being brought before the Constitutional Court, because the lack of competence has led to the absence of a corresponding motion. Shortly after this limitation of jurisdiction, although there were still attempts by petitioners to influence the constitutionality of the body’s position in borderline situations, and in some cases the Constitutional Court’s dogmatic reasoning allowed it to establish jurisdiction even in matters with budgetary implications, the picture has now become clearer and the Constitutional Court does not deal with financially and economically sensitive matters. This is also due to the fact that in cases such as the 98% special tax1 the Constitutional Court found it unconstitutional,2 and a two-thirds majority in Parliament made the possibility of imposing such special taxes part of the Fundamental Law by constitutional amendment.3 The Constitutional Court was then again called upon to take a position on the issue against the will of the government, but this time it took a more restrained position, according to which a rule could be made retroactively for a given tax year, if the tax year had not yet ended.4 The Constitutional Court thus sought to limit the legislator’s room for manoeuvre in even more cases after 2010, when the rule violated fundamental guarantees of the rule of law. This may have been partly due to the fact that the majority of the judges on the panel were long-standing members of the Constitutional Court who did not wish to change their professional position on certain constitutional issues.5