Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz

Constitutional Justice under Populism

The Transformation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Hungary since 2010


On the benchmarks for evaluating constitutional review1

Centralised constitutional review of the Kelsen-type, which entrusted the protection of the constitution to a constitutional court separate from the courts, became widespread when, in the course of democratic transitions in South-Central and Eastern Europe, states decided to introduce the Kelsen model rather than the American-style decentralised constitutional review, which had been in place for some time, when establishing their new constitutional system.2 Centralised constitutional review of the Kelsen-type has not directly affected the powers of the ordinary court. The decision of the constitutional courts was final on the question of constitutionality under consideration, but it contributed to the judicial resolution of specific disputes only indirectly, by possibly annulling the legislation. A few states, such as Greece, adopted a combination of the two systems of centralized and decentralized constitutional review, but in general, it was typical that states opted for either the American or the Kelsen model, and it was also typical that new democracies tended to see the centralised model as more effective.3 The horrors of the Second World War must have had a major impact on the considerable effort that states invested in developing constitutional and legal protection.4

Constitutional Justice under Populism

Tartalomjegyzék


Kiadó: Akadémiai Kiadó

Online megjelenés éve: 2024

ISBN: 978 963 454 971 0

In Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party won a landslide victory and the newly formed populist Orbán-government gained a two-thirds constitution-making parliamentary majority, which it has kept for four consecutive terms (so far). In the spring of 2011, the National Assembly adopted Hungary’s new Fundamental Law, which has since been amended twelve times. The transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and constitutional jurisprudence has played a significant role in cementing the new regime. The changes can be followed in a chronological order in this book. The author starts with the explanation of the concept of constitutional adjudication, she then reviews the procedural-institutional developments and the critical doctrinal junctures of the past thirteen years with regard to the general assessment of the change in constitutional justice. Finally, the volume offers a reading of how the scholarly experiences and factual results of the thirteen years spent under populism compare to the ideal of constitutional-court-made constitutional justice.

Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz is research professor at the Institute for Legal Studies, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and professor of constitutional law at ELTE Law School, Budapest. She worked as law clerk at the Hungarian Constitutional Court in different positions between 2003 and 2013. She has published extensively on different aspects of constitutional law, including the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the impact of different contemporary challenges to constitutional adjudication, as well as the rule of law resilience of Hungarian legal system.

Hivatkozás: https://mersz.hu/gardos-orosz-constitutional-justice-under-populism//

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